SINGAPORE – Two separate turbulence incidents on Singapore Airlines (SIA) and Scoot flights in June 2025 injured eight cabin crew members, two seriously, based on investigation reports released about a year later.
An SIA jet descending towards Shanghai Pudong International Airport encountered turbulence on June 27, 2025, seriously injuring one cabin crew member and causing five others to suffer minor injuries.
Separately, a Guangzhou-bound Scoot flight that departed Singapore on June 10 the same year experienced turbulence while cruising over the Ho Chi Minh flight information region in Vietnam.
One cabin crew member was seriously injured and another had minor injuries.
The accidents were disclosed on June 23 and 24, 2026, when the Transport Safety Investigation Bureau (TSIB) published its final investigation reports.
About 4.5 hours into the Shanghai-bound SIA flight, at around 5.11pm, the Airbus A350-900 jet began its descent, with the crew preparing the cabin for landing.
Moderate and heavy precipitation was detected on the weather radar display shortly after.
But the pilots looked out of the cockpit and saw an apparently clear path – about 20 nautical miles wide – between two weather cells. A weather cell refers to a pocket of unstable air that can produce hazardous weather conditions.
They noted that avoiding the left cell would require deviating extensively from the flight path, while circumventing the right cell might bring the aircraft beyond the boundary of the Shanghai flight information region.
They therefore decided to navigate through the narrow path, which would leave the aircraft at best 10 nautical miles from either cell. This is despite the flight crew training manual stating that they should avoid an area of greatest threat by at least 20 nautical miles.
The bureau said the pilots could have instructed cabin crew to be seated earlier when they decided to take that path, which was five minutes before the aircraft arrived near the two clouds.
The route also took the aircraft downwind of one of the cells, although the manual recommended deviating upwind where possible. TSIB noted, however, that these recommendations were not mandatory and served as a framework for pilots’ decision-making.
The aircraft then entered a cloud layer, meaning that the pilots could no longer see the weather cells outside. They relied entirely on the weather radar system on the navigation displays.
At 5.13pm, they requested permission from air traffic control to change the aircraft’s heading and received approval.
But when the jet exited the cloud layer, the pilots saw that a tall cumulonimbus cloud that typically brings severe weather was very close to the left of the plane.
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They immediately radioed air traffic control at 5.18pm for permission to make a further heading change, so they could steer clear of the cloud.
But the captain decided that it was necessary to initiate the heading change without delay, before receiving the go-ahead from air traffic control.
Five seconds after making the request to air traffic control, the plane hit turbulence while descending through 27,500ft.
Findings showed that the vertical acceleration of the plane dropped from plus 1G to plus 0.66G in two seconds, before rising to plus 1.78G in 1.5 seconds. It then dropped to minus 0.02G before peaking at plus 2.63G over the next 0.75 seconds. The jet returned to stable flight after a further five seconds or so.
Gravitational forces, or G-forces, measure rapid acceleration or deceleration by comparing it with the normal pull of gravity on earth. The normal baseline is set at plus 1G, meaning that at plus 2.63G, a person would feel as if they were 2.63 times their body weight.
The bureau said the inflight manager reported that several cabin crew members had become “airborne momentarily” during the turbulence, with two of them more seriously affected than the others and relieved of their duties for the rest of the flight.
The flight landed at about 6.17pm. One cabin crew member suffered a fractured left ankle, while the others were given outpatient treatment.
SIA revised part of its turbulence management framework to encourage its pilots to adopt a “more conservative approach” when dealing with weather and get cabin crew to secure the cabin earlier if necessary.
It also introduced a new tool for pilots to identify rapidly developing cumulus clouds that could become thunderstorms and make more accurate assessments.
In the Scoot incident, the Boeing 787-8 was cruising at 39,000ft at about 7.06am on June 10, 2025, when its speed started to creep upwards, alerting the pilots to possible turbulence ahead.
The pilots intended to request permission from Ho Chi Minh air traffic control to deviate to the right of their flight path, but could not do so because of heavy radio traffic.
The captain believed that the aircraft could fly through a patch of green weather returns, which indicated light rain. He proceeded to switch on the “fasten seat belt” sign.
Before he could make an announcement asking cabin crew to take their seats, the flight encountered turbulence for 32 seconds – during which the aircraft sped up and deviated 200ft, or about 61m, from its assigned altitude.
The report said switching on the “fasten seat belt” sign and making the announcement when the pilots first considered deviating from their path might have given the cabin crew more time to secure themselves.
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TSIB noted that one alternative method to seat the cabin crew quickly was for the flight crew to press the “fasten seat belt” switch more than once, if there was not enough time to make an announcement.
The vertical acceleration of the aircraft increased from plus 1G to plus 2.25G in six seconds before dropping to plus 0.4G over the next four seconds, then rising to plus 2.09G in the following eight seconds. It then dropped to plus 0.39G over the next eight seconds and returned to plus 1G in the subsequent six seconds, before stabilising at its cruising level of 39,000ft.
The bureau found that some of the cabin crew members were “lifted off momentarily” and “fell back” onto the cabin floor during the turbulence. Meal service for passengers had already been completed.
The flight continued with fewer cabin crew members, as two of them were injured and relieved of their duties. It arrived at Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport at 9.22am.
Findings showed that the turbulence was more likely associated with areas of middle to dense convective clouds, which are formed by the condensation of warm and humid air.
The bureau said the incident highlights the need for pilots to be cautious when operating near adverse weather, and to switch on the “fasten seat belt” sign early when in doubt.
According to the report, Scoot has reminded its pilots to press the “fasten seat belt” switch more than once in an imminent turbulence situation to urgently alert cabin crew to sit down and secure themselves.
It also told its pilots that they could deviate from their assigned route without prior air traffic control clearance to avoid weather, and to use an alternative radio frequency to request a deviation if the main frequency was congested.
In May 2026, TSIB published its final report on SIA Flight SQ321, on which severe turbulence left one person dead and 79 others injured. The report said it was inconclusive whether there were problems with the weather radar, although the possibility that it failed to detect or display the weather could not be ruled out.
At least 10 turbulence incidents involving Singapore-registered aircraft were recorded from 2004 to 2025, based on TSIB’s air safety investigation reports.
ST has contacted SIA and Scoot for comment.
This article was first published in The Straits Times. Permission required for reproduction.
